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Abstract
In this paper, a supply chain consisted of one supplier and 
one retailer is studied. The retailer sells the product to 
customers by using e-commerce platform and customers 
receive the product offline. Distributing product is 
outsourced by the retailer. The supply chain is coordinated 
under the revenue-sharing contract in the static case. 
The supplier observes that the market scale change after 
the production plan in the supply chain is formulated. In 
centralized supply chain, the supplier only needs to adjust 
the retail price if the change of the market scale is in a 
certain range. The supplier needs to adjust the retail price 
and production quantities if the change is large enough. 
In decentralized decision, the supply chain cannot be 
coordinated. This means that the original revenue-sharing 
contract cannot coordinate the disrupted supply chain. 
An improved revenue-sharing contract is put forward to 
coordinate the disrupted supply chain. The research shows 
that the improved contract can coordinate the original 
supply chain and the disrupted supply chain, which means 
that the contract has robustness when facing the market 
scale disruption. Finally, some numerical examples are 
also given.
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INTRODUCTION
The e-commerce market grows rapidly all over the 
world in recent years. E-commerce market in Europe 
is a relatively mature market and evolves constantly. 
However, disruptions such as natural disasters, terrorism 
attacks, major public health events, financial crisis, 
machine faults and strikes may affect business operation 
and supply chain management. An originally-coordinated 
supply chain cannot be coordinated because of some 
disruptions, and the survival of the supply chain members 
can be influenced by other disruptions. For example, a 
large number of airports in the United States were forced 
to close because of “9 • 11” terrorism attacks. Raw 
material supply in many companies all over U.S.A. was 
delayed because of the accident. Some supply chains are 
almost damaged due to this disruption and it results in a 
heavy loss. Large companies like Ford are also influenced 
by disruptions. Supply of engines and drive parts of 
Ford suspends for a long time due to the slow response 
of its procurement system, which makes five companies 
affiliated with Ford in North America close temporarily.
Disruptions will make market demand change greatly. 
For example, the spread of foot-and-mouth disease makes 
the demand for beef in Europe decrease dramatically, 
which affects the operation of the beef supply chain 
in Europe. The demand for tents and moving shelters 
increases dramatically in the disaster areas after the 
Wenchuan Earthquake, 2008, and a lot of enterprises 
manufacturing tents have to work overtime in order to 
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meet the demand, which affects the operation of their 
supply chain system. Recently, with the development of 
e-commerce, online shopping is widely spread all over 
China. Customers buy what they want online and evaluate 
the products after they receive them offline. According to 
some statistics, total sales volume in Taobao and Tmall, 
two companies subordinated to Alibaba, is about 19.1 
billion RMB on 11th November, 2012, which has great 
impact on the supply chain system. Retailers need to 
preorder a large number of products in order to meet the 
huge coming demand and the logistics system is greatly 
influenced by logistics activities such as purchasing, 
storing, transporting and distributing.
As can be seen above, supply chain members’ behavior, 
total supply chain profit and the survival of enterprises in 
supply chains can be affected by disruptions. The impact 
is so serious that it is necessary to study the strategy about 
how to coordinate supply chains when facing disruptions 
and this has been paid much attention by many companies 
and academic world.
A supply chain consisting of one supplier and one 
retailer is studied in this paper. The rest of this paper 
is organized as follows. The related researches are 
reviewed in Section 2. Benchmark model is established 
in Section 3. Section 4 coordinates the centralized 
supply chain with demand disruption. How to coordinate 
the decentralized supply chain with demand disruption 
is studied in Section 5 and an improved revenue-sharing 
contract is presented in this section. Numerical studies 
are illustrated in Section 6. Section 7 concludes this 
paper and some possible research opportunities in the 
future are also discussed.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
Researches related to this paper are known as disruption 
management. The concept “disruption management” is 
firstly put forward by Clausen (2001). It is used to solve 
the operations of Continental Airlines when it faces 
emergency. A conceptual model to analyze supply chain 
disruptions is put forward by Kleindorfer et al. (2005). A 
two-stage supply chain with demand disruption is studied 
by Xu (2003), Qi (2004) and Huang (2006), and the 
quantity discount contract is used to coordinate the supply 
chain. Giannoccaro (2004) studies a three-stage supply 
chain coordination by using revenue-sharing contract. 
Tomlin (2006) discusses a supply chain in which there 
exist two suppliers and one manufacturer when the supply 
chain faces disruption risks. Xu (2006) studies supply 
chain coordination when the production cost function is 
a convex function. Xiao (2005, 2008) studies a supply 
chain with one-manufacturer and two-retailers when 
the demand disruption occurs and extends the study to a 
more complex problem in which there exists competition 
between the two retailers. Lei (2012) examines how to 
coordinate a two-stage supply chain under asymmetric 
information with a linear contract when demand and cost 
disruptions happen simultaneously.
Compared with previous studies, there are some 
differences in this paper. Firstly, it analyzes a supply chain 
under e-commerce, a new background. We analyze the 
impact of the market scale on the e-commerce supply 
chain. Secondly, there exists retailer’s sales cost in the 
supply chain. Thirdly, this paper examines the effect of 
the revenue-sharing contract in supply chain coordination, 
which is also different from previous studies.
2. BENCHMARK MODEL
This paper examines a supply chain composed of one 
supplier (she) and one retailer (he), in which the supplier 
is the price leader and the retailer is the price follower. 
The transaction between the supplier and the retailer is 
done under symmetric information, which means that 
the supplier knows the retailer’s cost structure and profit 
function, and vice versa. The supplier sells a kind of short-
life-cycle product to the retailer according to a production 
plan which is based on market forecast. The retailer sells 
the product online and customers receive the product 
offline. The retailer outsources his product distribution 
business to a third-party logistics company. The retailer 
decides whether or not to buy the product according to the 
revenue-sharing contract the supplier offers.
Suppose that p is the retail price and the demand 
function that the retailer faces is a nonlinear function, i.e., 
d=Dp-2k. D is the market scale and cs is the supplier’s unit 
production cost. The retailer’s unit sales cost is cr which 
includes the unit cost of using e-commerce platform and 
the unit cost of distributing his product. The unit retail 
price is p and k (k>0) is the price sensitivity coefficient. 
Q is the realized demand under the retail price p. The 
demand function is Q=Dp-2k and the retail price is 
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. The total profit of the supply chain is
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. (1)
According to the first-order condition, we obtain that 
the optimal retail price is
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, (2)
the optimal production quantity is
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and the optimal supply chain profit is
 
1
2( / ) kp D Q  
1
2( ) ( / ) k s rf Q Q D Q c c
     
 
2 ( )
2 1
s rk c cp
k
 
 
2
2 ( )
k
s r
Q D
k c c
    
 
2
( ) 2 1( )
2 1 2 ( )
k
s r
s r
D c c kf Q
k k c c
      
 
1( )s rw c c
 
 
1( )s rw c c
 
 
(1 ) ( )s sf p Q w c Q    
(1 ) ( )sf f Q  
1
2( ) kD Dp
Q
   
1
2
1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )k s r
D Df Q Q c c b Q Q b Q Q
Q
           
 
Q Q   
Q Q   
Q Q   
1
2
1 1( ) ( ) ( )k s r
D Df Q Q c c b Q Q
Q
        
 
Q Q   
Q Q   
1
2
2 2( ) ( ) ( )k s r
D Df Q Q c c b Q Q
Q
        
 
Q Q   
 
. (4)
Lemma 1. The supply chain composed of one supplier 
and one retailer can be coordinated under the revenue-
sharing contract ( , )w   , where 
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 and 0<( , )w   <1.
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PROOF. By substituting 
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the supplier’s profit function, i.e., 
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we easily obtain that 
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. It shows that the 
revenue-sharing contract (w,φ ) coordinates the supply 
chain (Burguera, 2003; Cachon, 2005).
3.  COORDINATING CENTRALIZED 
S U P P LY  C H A I N  W H E N  D E M A N D 
DISRUPTION OCCURS
Centralized supply chain is a system which its decisions 
are made by the same decision-maker, the supplier. The 
supplier observes that demand disruption occurs after her 
production plan is formulated. It results in the change of 
the market scale. The disruption is captured by the term of 
ΔD if and only if D+ΔD>0, which ensure it is meaningful 
in the real world. Thus, the discussions followed are based 
on the condition mentioned above.
After the disruption occurs, the demand function is 
d=(D+ΔD)p-2k. The realized demand is Q=(D+ΔD)p-2k and 
the retail price is 
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. The corresponding total 
supply chain profit function is written as
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. (5)
The parameters b1>0 and b2>0 in Equation (5) are the 
marginal cost related to the change of the market scale 
and (x)+=max{0,x}. b1 is the extra increased unit cost 
due to increase production plan and b2 is the extra unit 
disposal cost due to selling the remained products in the 
secondary market at the price lower than the marginal 
production cost when the supply is greater than the 
demand. In order to further discuss the impact of the 
demand disruption on the original production plan, we 
put forward Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. When the demand disruption occurs, 
we assume that Q* is the optimal production quantity 
which maximizes the supply chain profit function 
shown in Equation (5). Then, 
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 if ΔD>0, and 
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 if ΔD<0.
Lemma 2 illustrates the following results. If the market 
scale increases, the supply needs to increase production 
quantities. If the market scale decreases, the supplier 
needs to decrease production quantities.
According to Lemma 2, if ΔD>0, then 
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. Thus, 
optimizing the total supply chain profit function f(Q) is 
equal to optimize the strictly concave function
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, (6)
subject to 
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.
If ΔD<0, then 
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. Thus, optimizing the total 
supply chain profit function f(Q) is equal to optimize the 
strictly concave function
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.
Theorem 1 is obtained by using the methodology 
similar to Xu (2003, 2006) and Qi (2004), which shows 
the optimal decisions in the centralized supply chain when 
the demand disruption occurs.
Theorem 1. When the market scale disruption occurs 
and the demand function is d=(D+ΔD)p-2k, the supplier in 
the centralized supply chain needs to adjust the optimal 
retail price and the optimal production quantities in order 
to optimize the total supply chain profit and coordinate 
the supply chain. According to different disruptions, the 
optimal retail price p* and the optimal production quantity 
Q* are shown as follows:
if
if
if
 (8)
if
if
if
 (9)
Theorem 1 shows the following results. When 
disruptions make the market scale change, there exists 
robustness in the original production plan. When ΔD is 
in certain range, the original production quantity does 
not need to be changed but the corresponding retail 
price needs to be adjusted in order to compensate for the 
extra cost derived from the disruption. If ΔD exceeds 
certain value, the original production quantity needs to be 
adjusted and the corresponding retail price also needs to 
be adjusted according to the change of the market scale. 
It is also shown that the original revenue-sharing contract 
cannot coordinate the supply chain when the demand 
disruption occurs. We need to redesign the contract 
in order to coordinate the supply chain, which will be 
discussed in the next section.
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, 
the total supply chain profit in this case is
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Thus, we obtain that
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4. COORDINATING DECENTRALIZED 
S U P P LY  C H A I N  W H E N  D E M A N D 
DISRUPTION HAPPENS
Decentralized decision means that each member in the 
supply chain does his business according to his own 
maximum profit. In the centralized decision, when the 
market scale change, the optimal strategy for the retailer is 
to choose the retail price p* and the procurement quantity 
Q*. In decentralized decision, if the supply chain members 
sign an appropriate contract which also makes the retailer 
choose p* and Q*, the decentralized supply chain obtains 
the optimal supply capacity which is equal to that in the 
centralized supply chain. This means that the supply chain 
is coordinated. The revenue-sharing contract is used to 
coordinate the decentralized supply chain.
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. Concerning a given 
revenue allocation ratio 
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, the supplier offers the 
retailer an improved revenue-sharing contract in which 
the wholesale price is 
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.
Theorem 2. When the market scale change in the 
decentralized supply chain, the supply chain can be 
coordinated by the revenue-sharing contract 
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and the optimal total supply chain profit can be 
allocated between the supplier and the retailer in any 
given ratio.
PROOF. Concerning a given revenue allocation ratio 
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, the retailer’s profit function under the improved 
revenue-sharing contract 
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 is shown below.
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By substituting w(Q) into the equation mentioned 
above, we easily obtain that 
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. Thus, the 
supply chain is coordinated by the contract and the 
optimal supply chain profit can be allocated between 
the supply chain members in any given allocation 
ratio by adjusting the parameter φ . This means that 
the improved revenue-sharing contract 
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 can 
coordinate the decentralized supply chain. Furthermore, 
if ΔD=0, then b1=b2=0. The supply chain profit function 
in this case is 
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 and the wholesale price is 
w(Q)=w. This means that the improved revenue-sharing 
contract 
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 can coordinate the supply chain when 
the disruption of the market scale does not occur. In 
other words, there exists anti-disruption ability in the 
improved contract.
5. NUMERICAL STUDIES
When the market scale disruption takes place, the optimal 
production quantity and the optimal retail price in the 
supply chain will be influenced, and the optimal supply 
chain profit and the allocation of the profit between the 
supply chain members will also be influenced. We will 
analyze the effect of the demand disruption on the supply 
chain performance, the supplier’s profit and the retailer’s 
profit by using numerical examples in this section.
Let D=1,500 , cs=3, cr=1 and k=1. The supplier and 
the retailer sign an agreement in which the supplier takes 
40% of the total channel revenue and the retailer takes the 
remainder part. This means that φ=0.6. In the static case, 
it is shown that the supplier’s optimal production quantity 
is 
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, the optimal retail price is 
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 and the optimal 
su ply chain profit is 
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.
Suppose that b1=0.5 and b2=0.2. When the market 
scale changes, there exist two types of demand disruption 
in the supply chain. We analyze two different strategies, 
the original strategy and the adjusted strategy, which 
are used in the supply chain after the demand disruption 
takes place. If the supplier does not recognize the impact 
of the disruption on the supply chain and does not make 
timely decision, he will continue to use the original retail 
price strategy which is called as the original strategy. We 
compare supply chain performance under the original 
strategy with that under the improved revenue-sharing 
contract, which is shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Supply Chain performance Under Demand Disruption
Case ΔD p
Q
w
f
x
 
p*
p
Q
w
f
x
 
Q*
p
Q
w
f
x
 
w*
p
Q
w
f
x
 
f*
1 500 8 9 31.25 24.69 1.4 1.42 121.09 122.83
2 400 8 9 29.69 23.46 1.4 1.40 115.63 117.27
3 300 8 8.76 28.13 23.44 1.4 1.4 110.16 111.65
4 -100 8 7.73 21.88 23.44 1.4 1.4 87.19 87.39
5 -200 8 7.6 22.51 20.31 1.4 1.40 80.63 80.84
6 -300 8 7.6 20.78 18.75 1.4 1.42 74.06 74.26
Note. 
p
Q
w
f
x
 
 is the original strategy and x*is the adjusted strategy.
As it can be seen from Case 1 and Case 2 in Table I, 
the optimal retail prices are the same while the optimal 
wholesale prices and the optimal production quantities 
need to be adjusted. The retail price here is larger than the 
original retail price. It shows the following results. If the 
disruptions of the market scale satisfy certain conditions, 
the retailer does not need to adjust the retail prices while 
the supplier needs to increase the production quantity and 
the wholesale price. This can balance the supplier’s profit 
when facing enlarged market demand. As is shown in 
Case 3 and Case 4, both the optimal production quantities 
and the optimal wholesale prices are the same while the 
optimal retail prices need to be adjusted. This means that 
there exists robustness in the optimal production quantity 
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decided at first and the revenue-sharing contract when 
dealing with the disruptions. When the demand increases, 
the retailer increases the retail price in order to balance 
the impact of the disruption. The retail price here is larger 
than the original retail price. When the demand decreases, 
the retailer decreases the retail price in order to balance 
the impact of the disruption. The retail price here is lower 
than the original retail price. The supplier does not need 
to adjust the production quantity and the wholesale price 
in both cases. As can be seen from Case 5 and Case 6, 
the optimal retail prices are the same while the optimal 
wholesale prices and the optimal production quantities 
need to be adjusted. The retail price here is lower than the 
original retail price. It shows the following results. If the 
disruptions of the market scale satisfy certain conditions, 
the retailer does not need to adjust the retail prices while 
the supplier needs to decrease the production quantity 
and increase the wholesale price. This can decrease the 
supplier’s loss when facing shrunk market demand. Last 
but not least, when the demand disruptions occur, the 
total supply chain profits under the improved revenue-
sharing contract are always larger than those under the 
original price strategy. It illustrates that there are better 
performances in using the revenue-sharing contract when 
dealing with the disruptions.
CONCLUSION
A one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain is studied in 
this paper when the market scale change. In centralized 
decision, the supplier needs to increase the production 
quantity when the market demand increases. The 
supplier needs to decrease the production quantity when 
the market demand decreases. There exists robustness 
in the original production plan. In other words, when 
the disruptions satisfy a given condition, the original 
production quantity does not need to be adjusted and the 
supplier only needs to adjust the corresponding retail price 
in order to deal with the demand disruptions. The retail 
price and the production quantity need to be adjusted 
when the demand disruptions exceed certain value. An 
improved revenue-sharing contract is used to coordinate 
the decentralized supply chain, which can maximize the 
total supply chain profit. It is noted that the results derived 
in this paper also illustrates the generality of the revenue-
sharing contract. Finally, some numerical examples are 
also given to analyze the supply chain performance when 
the original price strategy in basic model and the adjusted 
price strategy in the demand disruption are carried out 
respectively.
There are abundant opportunities in the future. For 
example, it is interesting to study more complex supply 
chain when the information of profit and cost between 
the participants is asymmetric. It is worth coordinating 
the same supply chain system when the demand 
disruption and the supplier’s production cost disruption 
occur simultaneously. Another direction is to study the 
problem which the demand function the retailer face is an 
exponential and more complex function. More complex 
supply chain structure with other disruptions is also worth 
studying.
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